The US goes for Hezbollah's jugular
Understanding the Syria escalation and how it can draw Iran and Türkiye deeper into conflict.
Commercial Summary: The offensives in Syria by various US proxies, including jihadi groups and their rival Kurdish groups, is intended to cut off the ground connection between Iran and Hezbollah. Iran is likely to double down to defend Hezbollah, including by sending ground forces rather than advisors and militias. This will likely lead to greater Turkish-Iranian escalation.
On 27 November, the day the Israel - Hezbollah ceasefire came into effect, Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria’s Idlib Province launched an offensive towards Aleppo Province and City and Hama Province and City. They entered Aleppo City by the 29th. Pro-Turkish media outlets claimed that the offensive used drone tactics provided by Ukrainian intelligence. Other outlets claimed more significant Ukrainian support.
In addition to the Aleppo offensive, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces – a PKK cutout and therefore a sworn enemy of Türkiye – launched an offensive in Deir Ezzor on 3 December. Their aim was to reduce the buffer around Deir Ezzor city, to pave the way for a direct assault. Deir Ezzor is a critical logistics node on the Iran-Syria supply line.
It’s the logistics, stupid.
The combined effect of US-backed offensive, including those of the Turkish-backed jihadi opposition and of Turkiye’s enemies in the Syrian Democratic Forces, is to threaten the logistics supply lines of the Syrian government and Hezbollah connecting to Iraq and Iran, as explained in detail below:
The importance of Aleppo is that it is the terminus of a supply road from Baghdad to Damascus, and therefore from Iran to Lebanon.
The main road connecting Iraq to Syria extends from Iraq’s Qa’im to Syria’s Bu Kamal, and on to Al Mayadeen and then Deir Ezzor. In Deir Ezzor, the road forks, with routes going through the desert to Hama, Homs and Damascus, and another staying alongside the Euphrates and terminating in Aleppo.
There is a shorter route from Baghdad to Damascus through al-Tanf via the desert, but it is blocked by the Americans.
All the desert roads are vulnerable to Islamic State cells, making the riverside road from Bu Kamal to Aleppo the safest. Once in Aleppo, trucks going between Aleppo and Homs or Damascus become inconspicuous, part of the normal trade traffic.
US aircraft also participated in an attack on the city of Al Mayadeen, an even more important logistics hub along the same route from Iraq to Syria.
The attack on Aleppo required the Syrian government to relocate forces from other frontlines. The Deir Ezzor frontline is one of them, and perhaps one of the most important. Without Deir Ezzor, neither Hezbollah nor the Syrian government can receive Iranian equipment or Iraqi manpower.
If Deir Ezzor is lost, the government’s ability to hold Hama and Homs will be severely reduced. If Homs is lost, Damascus is cut off from the coast, and the road is clear for Sunni jihadis to enter Lebanon’s Beka’a. The Beka’a region is Hezbollah’s strategic depth.
Critically, if the US wanted to, it could use its air force to fully support attacks on Deir Ezzor and Al Mayadin. This would be an attack on Syrian government forces and an act of war without Congressional authorisation, but we believe that the US is approaching a post-constitutional phase.
There are other reasons for Türkiye’s support for its proxies’ offensive on Aleppo, tied to Turkish nationalist historic claims on the city, returning Syrian refugees in Türkiye, creating a buffer between Iran-backed forces and the Turkish border, and improving Türkiye’s bargaining position in Syria. These are beyond the scope of this piece. More importantly, they will not change Iran’s perspective.
Impact:
The offensive is existential for Iran, in that it threatens to eliminate Hezbollah:
With Hezbollah severely weakened by the war with Israel, it needs resupply more than ever.
If the city of Homs is threatened, this would pave the way for the entry of Sunni jihadis into the Bekaa, Hezbollah’s strategic depth in Lebanon.
Weakening Hezbollah further by overstretching it in Syria paves the way for a second round with Israel if the fragile 60 day ceasefire, which ends in January, falls apart.
As a result, Iran has said that it is willing to consider sending ground forces into Syria, rather than militias and advisors, into Syria.
This would almost certainly lead Türkiye to send ground forces into Syria.