The Trump Doctrine
In a flurry of activity and statements, a cogent, coherent strategy emerges.
Commercial Summary: The Trump Doctrine is to confront China everywhere at all costs. To that end, Trump will seek to dismantle the alliance structure around China, by attempting to make deals with Russia and Iran. He will reduce the value of Taiwan by opening the Northwest Passage, making northeast Asia far more reliant on the US in the likely event of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.
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It has been a whirlwind of activity by the new Trump administration.
As usual, opinion on Donald Trump is divided between two camps: “I’ve not idea what he’s doing but I trust him”, and, “he’s a lunatic”.
As usual at Modad Geopolitics, we take Trump very seriously, accepting that he is smarter than we are, and that there is a method to what the uninitiated perceive as madness.
If one brings together Marco Rubio’s recognition that this is a multipolar world, Rubio telling the Chinese that the US opposes Taiwanese independence, calls by Keith Kellogg’s, Trump’s representative to Ukraine, for elections in Ukraine, Trump’s pressure to annex Canada and Greenland, Trump’s call for a negotiation with Iran, and Trump’s decision to build 40 icebreakers, a simple picture emerges.
The Trump Doctrine, as we see it, is Harming China First. Everything that is being done is focussed on the single, overarching theme of enabling America to weaken China and dismantle its alliance structure, while accepting that the existing liberal system, its institutions, and its norms are a hinderance, not a help.
Greater North America and Asia
Trump intends to keep trade routes to South Korea and Japan open even after China takes Taiwan. This is what the icebreakers are for, and this is what control of Canada and Greenland is for: With this new territory and a fleet of icebreakers, America can make the Northwest Passage via the Arctic far more commercially viable, and enable it to compete with Russia’s Northeast Passage (Northern Sea Route). Eventually, this would secure access to northeast Asia, free from interference by geopolitical rivals.
By having this direct route to Korea and Japan, Trump severely reduces China’s ability to blockade both countries after it takes Taiwan, diminishing the island’s value. America’s access to the Arctic’s and Greenland’s natural resource potential would also be dramatically bolstered by these acquisitions, feeding American industry and reducing its dependence on imports.
Russia Ukraine War
Notably, Trump’s target of 40 icebreakers is intended to match Russia’s own icebreaker fleet, which keeps open the Northeast Passage, and which stands at 37 to 40 ships.
As acquiring Greenland, annexing Canada, and building a fleet of 40 icebreakers to open the Northwest Passage navigable take may years, and as it is critical to find alternative energy supply routes to Japan and Korea before China moves against Taiwan, Trump needs Russia and its Northeast Passage, for now. Especially as Russia can also provide natural resources to the industries of Korea and Japan.
Therefore, to make a deal with Russia, Trump is willing to sacrifice Ukraine - the Ukrainians are on the backfoot anyway, and will probably collapse in a year or two, if not less. Making a deal at their expense is the equivalent of selling a rapidly depreciating asset.
Critically, a deal with Russia followed by lifting sanctions would break China’s monopsony over Russia’s natural resources, harming China and releasing Russia from being closely aligned with China, and perhaps saving the moribund German economy.
The precise location of the Russian - Ukrainian border is strategically irrelevant to America. And so Trump is probably willing to hand over Odessa, which we believe is Russia’s minimum requirement for a political victory, as we explain in the link below. Zelensky would never accept this. Hence Kellogg’s call for elections: to be rid of Zelensky.
A multipolar world
Rubio’s statement about this being a multipolar world does several things. First, it recognises China’s global role, and this message is reinforced by the US stating its opposition to Taiwan independence. This delays China’s move against Taiwan, or so Rubio and Trump would hope. Second, it recognises that Russia will have a major role in this multipolar world, paving the way to partner with it and end the Chinese monopsony over its natural resources. That in turn paves the way for closer Russian - Korean - Japanese cooperation to contain China, with America’s blessing.
Trump would be enabling the great and regional powers to compete, while America remains first among equals. If our analysis is correct, this would be a realistic America First strategy, that neither relinquishes the American Empire nor overextends it. We have long maintained that Trump wants competent imperialism, not isolationism.
The coming Taiwan conflict
Our current view is that China’s coming takeover of Taiwan will not initiate a conflict with the US, but, rather, the isolation of China through sanctions and tariffs, while sanctions on Russia and Iran are removed. We believe Taiwan will not be autonomous by 2030 at the latest, and likely sooner.
The US will help Taiwan fight as long as Taiwanese resistance lasts, and as long as Taiwan can keep its eastern seaports open. However, America will not join the fight itself. And most likely nor will Japan or North Korea.
We note that China is building a fleet of specialised vessels designed to land Chinese men and materiel on Taiwanese coastal highways. Previously, Taiwan’s defence strategy was centred on concentrating firepower on a few beaches where the Chinese were most likely to land troops. This expands the possible set of landings dramatically. Since this has been revealed, the Chinese will need to move sooner rather than later.
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Iran Deal and the death of BRICS
Removing sanctions on Iran in exchange for a nuclear deal is now much more feasible, given that Iran’s access to Syria - and therefore Hezbollah - is shut, and that Iran’s proxy strategy has failed. The only obstacle is the Islamic Republic’s fear that a deal would further delegitimise it and show its failure, paving the way for its overthrow.
In any case, removing Iran sanctions also ends China’s monopsony over Iranian oil exports. Without Russia and Iran forced to provide China with energy resources at a discounted price, the Chinese economy would somewhat suffer, but not inordinately so.
More important is that, freed from the Chinese monopsony, Russia and Iran would pursue their geopolitical interests in Central Asia, which often run counter to those of China, and that this would greatly reduce the value BRICS.
And BRICS’s ambitions will die quickly, as Russia becomes a critical provider of oil and gas to Japan and Korea, leaving China hemmed in by India, Russia, Korea, Japan, Turkey, Iran, and Australia.
BRICS will remain what it always was: a club created to enable non-Western powers to trade freely without Western interference. But its main raison d’etre, the need to trade in critical resources without American interference and without using dollars, would be gone once sanctions on Russia and Iran are removed.
Commercial Impact
Once again, we repeat, we are living in the Clash of Civilisations, not in an “international rules based order”. The only people who do not see this are deluded liberals, libertarians, free traders, and other bien pensants, whose policies led to a Chinese-Russian-Iranian alliance that feeds Eurasia’s natural resources to the Chinese industrial beast.
Everything is being done to contain China and dismantle its alliance system, including expanding American territory to facilitate trade with Asia, reconciling with China’s allies to break up its alliance system, drawing China into a proxy war in Taiwan that justifies escalating the trade war against it, and eventually pushing Japan and Korea to side with Russia and against China.
Clients ought to ask us what this means for Azerbaijani oil, Turkish-Russian relations, the role of Turkey and Russia in Africa, and Red Sea security.