The Next Sykes Picot
As the Syrian civil war resumes, partition and new borders become more likely.
Commercial topics: Sanctions, minorities and foreign backing, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria’s borders, Israeli expansion.
On 6 March, Alawite insurgents launched attacks throughout the Syrian coastal area, targeting new regime forces, killing between 50 and 120, and attempting to seize key buildings and supply routes. This followed a number of attacks on Alawites and regime loyalists in Homs, Hama, and the coast, as well as against Christians, and attempts to capture Suweida (Druse majority) through various indirect means. It also followed the new Syrian authorities’ decision to dismiss thousands of former government and military officials, who, in the current economic climate, have no income.
In response to the attacks on new security forces, jihadi factions, including foreign fighters, cleared the insurgents, then launched a pogrom against Alawites, and, to a lesser extent Christians. Reports of the numbers killed vary between the hundreds and two thousand, and are impossible to verify. Journalists say that entire families were killed.
Helicopters controlled by the new government dropped barrel bombs - the same type used by Assad - against regions suspected of disloyalty. These bombs are notoriously inaccurate, and have limited military utility as a result.
President Sharaa is in an impossible bind. Receiving economic aid from the Arabs is conditional on distancing himself from Turkey and the jihadi factions. Receiving Turkish support is critical for his ability to maintain security, however, especially as Turkey is his only existing economic partner and the main channel for trade with the world. And the jihadis are the main force he relies on when fighting domestic enemies. As an astute Lebanese observer noted, Assad was stuck in a similar position: the Arabs promised him aid if he distanced himself from Iran, but his security depended entirely on Iran. Distancing himself from Iran helped lead to his collapse.
Implications:
Syria and Israel
The removal of Assad has resulted in the emergence of dozens of mini-Assads, none of them able to make a state function.
Sharaa has now been shown that, when any of the minorities challenge his rule, he will have to rely on foreign jihadis and extremist factions. This obstructs his ability to transition from jihadi criminal to statesman, and his effort to unify factions under a new defence and interior ministry.
The Druse of southern Syria had already refused to hand their weapons over before a new stable state emerged. Now, they are very likely to turn fully against the new regime and prevent it from in any way exercising authority or even being present in their territories, especially given the public Israeli statements about backing them.
The Alawite insurgency is likely to seek support from both Iran and Israel, with a view to gaining control of the Syrian coast and the adjacent mountains. Christian Syrians in the West may align with this effort, and Russia may provide support as well.
The Kurds will now harden their position, and their willingness to compromise with the new Syrian authorities will become much lower. The actions of the new regime make it harder for the US to withdraw from Syria, though it still might.
Multiple extreme scenarios have become realistic:
Iraqi militias trying to re-enter Syria, in a bid to support the Alawites against the new Sunni leaders. This would require Israeli acquiescence.
Minorities in Syria asking explicitly for Israeli support against the new Syrian authorities, and Israel providing military aid and air support to build buffer zones led by minorities hostile to the Sunnis.
A coup in Iran, intended to turn the policy towards nationalism and self interest, rather than the current pan-Islamism.
Lebanon and Iraq
Lebanon’s Christian, Druse, Shi’a, and Alawite communities will now increasingly panic about the possibility of the fighting crossing the border. Indeed, one Sunni group in north Lebanon announced it was joining the fight, but it was quickly targeted by the Lebanese Army. Some of its members had already crossed into Syria, however. In Tripoli, localised fighting between Sunnis and Alawites briefly broke out.
The various minorities of Syria and Lebanon now have two potential regional allies, Iran and Israel. They will likely seek support from both. The Arab states can provide financing, but are not able to project power. Israel and Iran, despite their obvious hostility, share an interest in containing Turkey with the Gulf Arab states, as we explained here.
Russia will likely also be a key player in protecting minorities and helping them maintain sovereignty, while trying to balance its relationship with Turkey.
Hezbollah now will insist on keeping its arms, given the pogrom of the Alawites in Syria and its vulnerability in Lebanon.