The Fall of Damascus and the Death of Ataturk

Examining the regional and civilisational implications of the likely fall of Damascus.

Over the course of ten days, the Syrian government lost the cities of Aleppo and Hama, the country’s second and fourth largest. It is withdrawing from Homs, seemingly towards the coast.

Government forces are also pulling out of Dar’a in the south and Deir Ezzor in the east. The latter withdrawal is critical, as it cuts the supply line to Iraq and Iran.

The government is not putting up a fight in any of those localities. Rather, its forces are withdrawing, some to the coast, others to the capital.

The conquering forces are a hodgepodge of Turkish-backed Islamist and jihadi groups, the most prominent and capable of which is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda offshoot.

Implications

The battle of Damascus

• A key unknown is the duration of the battle for Damascus. With Iranian proxies and government forces concentrating there, the government side may offer stronger resistance than they have so far.

• Türkiye and Russia will likely reach an arrangement to avoid such a battle. Russia needs Türkiye far more than it needs Iran. And Türkiye has no need to cut relations with Russia and to side fully with NATO.

• The most likely outcome is therefore a negotiated exit for Assad, and Russia keeping its Mediterranean bases. The alternative is a pitched battle for both the coast and Damascus.

Clash of Civilisations

• If Damascus falls to Turkish proxies, this would signal the end of the modern nation state of Türkiye and the rebirth of the Ottoman Empire. Islam’s brief secular experiment will be dead and buried. Critically, the capture of Damascus would deliver not just Syria, but also Lebanon and possibly Jordan, into the neo-Ottoman Empire.

• When Erdogan prays in the Umayyad Mosque, formerly St John the Baptist Cathedral, the entire Muslim world will look to him for leadership. This brings us back to the Clash of Civilisations. A resurgent Ottoman Empire is bad news for the Greeks, the Slavs, and the Persians, and to all of Europe, especially with so many Muslim migrants there.

  

  The Grand Mosque of Damascus, also known as the Umayyad Mosque, formerly St John the Baptist Cathedral.

• At a time when religious and racial conflict in the West is set to intensify, as we discuss below, Türkiye will emerge as the key civilisational rival for the West once again, championing the forces of Islam against Christendom.

• Türkiye will use Europe’s Muslims as fifth columnists, with Greece, Bulgaria and the Balkans, as well as Germany, Britain and France, being especially vulnerable.

• Türkiye’s rise gives new impetus for Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria to repair their relations with Moscow. The longer Western governments’ commitment to social liberalism and to immigration survives, the weaker Western political influence in those countries. We discuss some of these ideas here.

• The capture of so much Syrian territory opens the possibility for ending talk of territorial integrity, and recognising the much more legitimate Right of Conquest. This would pave the way for border adjustments in the Middle East and Europe, centred on Syria, Iraq and Ukraine.

• Similarly, the politics of alliances and principles are now over. We are back to balance of power politics: a strong Türkiye makes Iran look like much less of a threat, and it is unclear if Türkiye, Russia or China is the bigger threat to the West at any given time. Astute foreign policy practitioners, if there are any in the West, will aim to separate these powers.

A new Middle East

• The nation-state experiment in the Levant is dying. The independence of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and to a lesser extent Jordan has been a catastrophe for their own peoples.

• The Turkish military may be asked to step in to Syria and Lebanon directly to protect the Christians, the Druze, the Ismailis and the Alawites under some international mandate, and to prevent infighting between Syrian militias or between the militias and Hezbollah.

• The Gulf Arab states do not want a strong Türkiye, as that would be a threat to their own legitimacy. They will side with Iran against Türkiye, and mediate between Iran and Israel.

• Iran’s losses in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza discredit the Islamic Revolution and make a stable succession to Khamenei less likely.

• A nationalist government built on the remnants of the IRGC would emerge, but would be challenged by Azeri, Baluch, Kurdish and Arab groups, opening the way for foreign intervention.

• With Iran’s influence reduced in Syria and Lebanon, the possibility of a deal with the US is much greater. The US, like Israel, and the Arabs, may wish to play off Iran against Türkiye.

Lebanon

• The Iranians’ ability to influence Syria and Lebanon is now severely reduced. If they wanted to supply their allies in Syria with manpower or materiel, it is unclear how they could do so without US or Israeli permission.

• Civil conflict in Lebanon is increasingly likely. Hezbollah does not want a civil war, nor do its foes, but Sunni factions in Tripoli, Khalde, Hermel, Sidon and the northern Beka’a have scores to settle with Hezbollah and may receive Turkish and Syrian jihadi backing to do so.

The Kurds, Iraq and the clash with Iran

• The Turks will eventually turn their attention against the Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces, who are backed by the US. The US may try to broker a deal between the two sides before withdrawing.

• The US presence in Iraq and Syria is now far less necessary for the security of Israel, given that the Iranian supply lines to Lebanon have been cut. This gives the US a political excuse to withdraw, leaving Israel, Iran and Türkiye facing each other.

• Türkiye will want to gain control of Sinjar, Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil in Iraq, in order to clear the PKK and gain energy independence using the reserves of the KRG and Kirkuk.

• This raises the risk of attacks using drones and of sabotage targeting energy infrastructure in northern Iraq. However, total write-offs of rigs and other energy infrastructure are unlikely.

• Iran will do all it can to hold on to southern Iraq, at least, and to its part of the KRG (Sulaymaniyah), including by using its militias to fight government forces. This fighting will raise the risk of extortion attacks against energy infrastructure, and of attempts to weaken the Baghdad government by cutting off its oil revenues.

• Access to Kirkuk’s oil reserves would reduce Turkish dependence on Iran and Russia, and pave the way for more conflicts with both.

Israel and Jordan

• Israel will continue to prioritise consolidating over the West Bank. This may destabilise Jordan, at a time when there are Shi’a jihadis on its eastern border and Sunni jihadis on its northern border, both, in theory, keen to fight Israel.

• If Türkiye’s proxies take Damascus, they will be in a position to threaten Amman. Jordan will have to acquiesce to any Turkish demands, as the Hashemites lack the legitimacy to oppose Türkiye. Jordan is now extremely vulnerable.

• Any Israeli-Turkish honeymoon will be short lived. Erdogan’s Islamic mindset requires him to remain hostile to Israel. His leadership has been so transformational that even the secular Turkish opposition now brags of its Islamic credentials.

• Turkish influence over Jordan may quickly turn into a nightmare for Israel.