The end of the US' pre-eminence in the Middle East
With the US killing a Kataib Hezbollah commander, Iran will exploit the US' weakness with attacks on US bases and Israeli ports, creating the next test of the US' tolerance for escalation.
Commercial Summary: The US’ position in the Middle East is extremely weak. Most analysts seem to be utterly unaware of this. I explore the reasons for the US’ weakness and the commercial implications, including for energy companies and weapons companies with business in the Gulf in the context of the ongoing Iran - US confrontation.
Analysis
Saudi Arabia chose not to become another Ukraine. It decided to opt out of confronting Iran on the US’ behalf.
Heretofore, the Saudi Arabian business model was based on paying the US for protection, under the rubric of weapons purchases.
The Saudis could not use the weapons they bought to achieve political ends. This was obvious in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, where Saudi influence subsided while Iranian influence rose.
The Saudis are in the process of conducting a historic shift. Saudi Arabia will now dedicate its resources to partnering with China and Iran, achieving better results.
Saudi Arabia, in the midst of the Red Sea crisis, has been announcing its intent to help develop Yemen, and its commitment to reconciliation with Yemen.
Taking away the diplomatic veneer, this is a commitment to compromise with Iran in Yemen, so long as Yemen is not used to attack Saudi Arabia, and even to finance reconstruction in territories controlled by Ansar Allah.
Saudi Arabia is also building ballistic missiles and drones domestically, with Chinese assistance. These weapons have proven more effective in achieving political ends than US aircraft and kit. This is demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s own experience fighting Ansar Allah in Yemen, and in Ansar Allah attacks on shipping, against which US aircraft have had no effect.
Note that Saudi Arabia is helping Russia evade sanctions, importing Russian refined products to satisfy its own markets, leaving more of its production to exports.
Saudi Arabia has no interest in Western sanctions against Russia succeeding, as this would pave the way for similar sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, against Saudi Arabia, over issues ranging from the green agenda to human rights violations.
Egypt is similarly turning away from the US. The US’ hare-brained ideas for Egypt have included:
Promoting democracy in the early 2000s, paving the way for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood
Supporting the 2011 Arab Spring protests, including by training Egyptian activists and having US internet companies back the protesters.
Overthrowing the Libyan regime, leading to jihadi groups operating along Egypt’s Western border.
Destabilising Sudan, threatening Egypt’s core national security interests.
Looking away while Ethiopia built the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River. Egypt is the gift of the Nile, and without Nile waters, cannot exist.
Promoting alternatives to the Suez Canal - Egypt’s most reliable foreign currency earner and a key component of its geopolitical relevance.
These are the actions of an enemy, not an ally.
Egypt therefore has every interest in Hamas surviving. Threatening Israeli security is a means for Egypt to remain politically relevant to the US and the West, and therefore of extracting concessions.
This is in addition to Egypt’s fear that Israel would expel the Palestinians to Sinai, leading to resistance to Israel out of Sinai, leading to Israeli operations to capture Sinai territory.
Last, as Israel appears so weak as to be unable to defeat Hamas, and to be deterred by Hezbollah, Egypt needs to prepare for the day when the state of Israel no longer exists.
It is worth repeating that the Zionist project appears increasingly unviable. Israel lacks the strategic depth, population, and, increasingly, military capabilities to keep humiliating the Muslim world.
Egypt needs to align with Hamas, as a strong Sunni militant movement, to guard its interests in the Levant. Egypt has traditionally been invaded from Greater Syria, through Palestine and the Sinai. Sunni Hamas can eventually act as a buffer against Iranian influence there.
(Some analysts believe that the Sunni - Shia conflict can end. This is delusional. In 2011, it appeared that the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood would rule the Middle East. Hamas responded by breaking out of the Shia-led alliance and aligning with the Sunnis, it did so, and sided with Al-Qaeda and similar groups against the Alawite regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. An enmity that has lasted 1300 years can safely be expected to survive for another 1300 years).
The UAE is in a similar position. It is actively helping Iran to evade sanctions, out of fear of attack by Iran’s allies. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has concluded that the US cannot guarantee its security.
Going forward, the US will rely on minor Middle Eastern countries that are unable to help it achieve major political objectives.
These include Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain and, to a lesser extent, Qatar.
These countries’ independence, and the positions of their ruling families, is dependent on the US - led order. They realise that once the US’ influence is gone, they may be gone too.
However, an enterprise as significant and costly as confronting Iran cannot be done with allies of this calibre.
Pink - US controlled area in Syria. Green - Syrian and Iraqi governments and allied militias. Yellow - Kurds. Some US bases in the region also shown.
Commercial Implications
Following the 7 February assassination of Abu Baqir Al-Sa’edi, a senior commander in Kataib Hezbollah (part of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units), Iran is likely to apply pressure to these US allies, while also intensifying pressure on Israel.