President Irrelevant
American elections do not influence American foreign policy. This one will be no different.
Commercial Summary: Simultaneous foreign policy crises are increasingly likely regardless of who is president. The difference that a president can make is domestic, not international. Harris can cripple American energy and industry through excessive regulation during crises, while Trump is more likely to unleash the American economy and benefit from crises.
The Democratic Party found President Joe Biden too mentally incapacitated to run for office, replacing him as candidate by Vice President Kamala Harris. This occurred while the US is managing a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, and a proxy war with Iran in the Middle East, with a severe risk of one or the other drawing in the America directly.
And yet, a president who is unfit to be a candidate remains in charge of the nuclear codes.
How can this be?
The answer is, simply, that the president is irrelevant.
Recall that President Biden had warned against providing Ukraine with tanks and long-range weapons. The US then provided both. Mr. Biden claimed that providing F-16s would lead to World War III. Now, F-16s are in Ukraine.
Biden’s ability to oppose the defence establishment has been non-existent for some time.
Historic norm
Lest you believe that this is a recent development or a partisan claim, recall that President George W Bush, as a candidate, campaigned on reducing foreign intervention and on a “humble” foreign policy. Bush ended up invading Afghanistan and Iraq. He even got stuck trying to build liberal democracies there, a project of such breathtaking hubris one is at a loss for printable adjectives.
President Obama ran on reducing unnecessary foreign commitments and on his opposition to “dumb wars” and “rash wars”. Yet he ended up arming the head choppers of the Syrian opposition, instigating a global refugee and terrorism crisis. Obama rashly overthrew Mu’ammar Gaddafi in Libya, leading to the re-establishment of slave markets there and a migrant wave that persists even today. Obama was drawn back into Iraq in 2014, despite his brief partial withdrawal in 2011. Then he ended up deploying forces to Syria. And on Obama’s signature policy, the Iran nuclear agreement, Congress intervened to impose on Iran sanctions identical to the presidential ones, ensuring that Obama could not make any meaningful concessions well before Trump walked away from the deal.
President Trump did partly buck the trend: unlike Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama, Trump did not start new wars. And yet, he failed at everything else. He could not execute the Afghanistan withdrawal in his first term, despite the pointlessness of that war being evident. And he could not withdraw from Syria, as he had publicly said he would.
Trump tried to reconcile with Russia. The establishment used false allegations of Trump colluding with Russia to pressure him into arming Ukraine. Congress then passed CAASTA, Combatting America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. CAASTA imposed sanctions on those who bought Russian weapons or invested in Russia energy, and strengthened sanctions on North Korea, to make sure Trump did not get any ideas there.
At every juncture where there was an opportunity for an American president to de-escalate, he either failed to take it or was thwarted by an entrenched establishment. Every time there was an opportunity to escalate, no matter how hesitant a president was to take it, the same establishment made sure that the escalation eventually happened.
A second Trump term
It is fashionable to believe that Trump would reconcile with Russia, re-engage North Korea in talks, confront Iran more effectively, and deter China.
Nonsense.
On Russia, all Trump can do is delay or slow down the delivery of aid to Ukraine until Congress forces him to. Congress, using the power of the purse, can thwart Trump and specify which weapons to deliver to Ukraine, continuing the war. Congressional leaders can force Trump into domestic-foreign trade-offs, whereby even Republican Congressional support for Trump’s domestic objectives is made contingent on continuing to back Ukraine. Every Democrat Congressional vote, and most Republican votes, would go against a reconciliation with Russia, paralysing Trump’s foreign policy.
On North Korea, there is no way that Kim Jung Un, who is already on his third American president since taking the reins of power in 2012, would trust Trump. Kim’s path is set. He will hold on to his nuclear weapons no matter what. Kim may take some goodies from America if these are offered, but only in exchange for a lull in nuclear and missile tests. And, this time, Trump’s bombastic threats will have far less effect. Rather, if China escalates against Taiwan and the US is drawn in, Kim would be more likely to escalate in support of China and against South Korea and Japan, in part due to decades of American threats.
On Iran, the defence establishment has already decided that it is willing to back Israel enough for the US to be drawn into war with Iran. Trump may have an impact there if he wanted to prevent war. But that is not what Trump is saying he wants to do. He is encouraging Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear and energy assets. This may suit the US: a pro-hydrocarbons policy in the US would be especially likely to boost the American economy if the Iranians are threatening or even striking Gulf Arab energy infrastructure. It is only Iran where Trump could make a difference, if he were to impose a ceasefire on Israel. This is the arena where Trump is least likely to change policy, however.
And as for China, what can Trump do differently? The US is already providing Taiwan with advanced weapons. China is already training on blockading the island, including cutting off the one million barrels of oil that it must import daily to function. China is operating on its own timetable, not Trump’s. More belligerence and a harsher trade war may convince China to act against Taiwan, while compromises will be used to prepare for the inevitable showdown with America. Which may still occur during Trump’s putative second term.
President Harris
Harris lacks the force of character of Obama or Trump, or the experience of Biden. She will not stand against the establishment.
The only difference Harris can make is domestic: in the midst of an energy crisis triggered by a Middle Eastern war, she may end up restricting American oil and gas for her Net Zero zealotry. During a supply chain and sanctions war with China, she may impose additional DEI requirements, new environmental regulations, or new taxes, hindering the relocation of industries to the US. Her skillset is suited to making things worse domestically, and there is no one less likely to make things better internationally. Trump, by contrast, in his low-tax, low-regulation zeal, would be likely to better position the American economy to benefit from foreign crises.