New Israeli Doctrine

Implications for sanctions on Lebanon and Syria, for stability in Jordan and Egypt, and for the continuation of the Gaza War and the West Bank.

Commercial Summary: Sanctions relief in Syria will be limited to humanitarian goods, not energy or infrastructure, until the Syrian authorities normalise ties with Israel. The war in Gaza is likely to resume. Israel will intensify its military activities in the West Bank to push the Palestinians into a smaller space, and eventually out. Egypt and Jordan find themselves in a difficult bind. Israel and Turkey are now on a collision course.

Israel has begun releasing details of its investigations into Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack, and some lessons learned. Among the lessons learned are the following:

1. Change in defence doctrine:

   1. Israel will seek to establish three rings of defence. The first will be fortified border positions near Israeli civilian areas on Israel’s borders. The second will be an Israeli occupied buffer zone. And the third will be a weapons-free zone within enemy territory.

   2. This has already been partly implemented in Syria, with Israel building up defences along the Golan Heights, expanding its presence within Syrian territories into Druse villages, reaching 30km from Damascus, and banning the new Syrian authorities from establishing a military presence in the Syrian Provinces of Quneitra, Der’a, and Suweida in southern Syria.

      

      The Golan Heights (dark blue), the new Israeli gains (light blue), Druze-dominated Suwaida (purple), and Quneitra and Deraa Provinces between them.

   3. Israel is pursuing a similar objective in Lebanon. It has established new observation posts within Lebanon (in violation of the ceasefire agreement) and has forced Hezbollah to surrender its weapons south of the Litani River to the Lebanese Army (a process that has been largely completed). However, Hezbollah retains its weapons north of the Litani, but is entirely unable to handle the level of Israeli intelligence penetration.

2. Moving away from “conflict management”:

   1. The Israelis will no longer seek to deter or manage the conflict with enemies that seek their destruction, like Hamas and Hezbollah, nor will be they bound by “deterrence formulas” as had been the case with Hezbollah from 2006 until September 2024.

   2. Rather, Israel will seek to destroy those who wish to destroy it, or at least to destroy their warfighting capabilities.

   3. The idea of managing conflicts in a way that permits enemies to continue to increase their combat effectiveness, as had occurred before 7 October 2023, is no longer acceptable to Israel.

   4. Israeli investigations show that during the Jewish Easter of 2023, Hamas was close to launching the operation that it launched on 7 October, while the IDF’s Chie of Staff Herzi Halevi was in the Gaza envelope - he would have likely been injured or killed if this had occurred, decapitating the IDF.

   5. The Israelis now believe they can be attacked at any moment, and their doctrine in changing accordingly.

   6. This ties into Trump backing the expulsion of the Palestinians. The Israelis will not have such an opportunity again, and they will do everything they can to exploit it.

   Separate from the above lessons learned, Israel is also seeking to keep Syria weak and unstable:

   1. Benjamin Netanyahu has committed to defending the Druse of Syria against the new authorities.

   2. Simultaneously, the Druse are fighting Syrian government forces in Damascus’ Jaramana neighbourhood.

   3. The Druse had previously combined their formations in southern Syria, in anticipation of escalation against the Syrian government.

   4. Israel views a Turkish-dominated Syria as a key threat to Jordan, the Gulf, Egypt, and itself. The new Syrian regime, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s Abu Mohammad al-Jolani/Ahmed al-Shara’, is fully backed by Turkey.

Commercial Impact:

Lebanon and Syria

• Israel has partly achieved its defensive military objectives in line with the above doctrine in Lebanon and Syria.

• However, Israel sees Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as a Muslim Brotherhood organisation indistinguishable from Hamas, and will not allow it to govern. For its part, HTS is trying its best not to provoke Israel, knowing full well that it is not a match for it.