Middle East War Update
Israel is losing the war against Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Resistance Axis retains multiple escalation options.
Summary: Hezbollah has shown great ability to penetrate Israel’s layered air defence system, making Israeli claims to have intercepted 99% of Iranian munitions on 13 April even less credible. Israel is failing to defeat Hamas in Gaza, with Hamas showing strong evidence of having intact intelligence and command and control. The Resistance Axis is holding back on attacks in the Mediterranean, most likely with the intend of taking that step if Israel’s attack on Rafah is too successful. The US is participating in the siege of Hamas in Gaza, exposing it to attack. It is worth noting that attempts to besiege Hamas have failed for 17 years and this will not be any different.
To start, we remind our readers that victory in war is not measured in buildings destroyed or enemies killed – the Russians suffered more damage than the Germans, but won World War II. Success in war is measured in terms of achieving political objectives. Israel aims to destroy Hamas, and it is failing to do so. It also aims to force Hezbollah to stop its attacks, but is unable to do so.
Siege on Hamas
By taking control of the Rafah border crossing, and having the US control aid deliveries through the new floating pier that the US has built, the joint Israeli American objective is to control all goods that are allowed into Rafah, thereby imposing a siege on resistance factions in Gaza.
From the perspective of the Palestinian militant factions and the Resistance Axis, this makes the United States a partner in the siege of Gaza, albeit under humanitarian pretexts. From the US’ perspective, this is justified, as it is helping provide aid to Palestinian civilians while besieging Hamas, which it considers a terrorist organisation.
The closure of Rafah, and the intent to impose a renewed siege on Gaza, suggests that the US and Israel, contrary to US public statements, are planning a lengthy conflict still.
As such, the US presence off the shores of Gaza is likely to come under attack from Hamas and other groups.
Hamas’ survival depends in part on its ability to control access to Egypt, for both financial reasons – the group taxes legitimate trade through Rafah – and logistics reasons – the tunnels along the border are the main means of transferring weapons and goods used in weapons manufacturing.
For the Resistance Axis, turning the current Gaza War into a new normal that can continue indefinitely is likely unacceptable, given the human suffering and the risk that Hamas would eventually be severely weakened or defeated through the closure of Rafah. Maintaining resupply is critical in war.
Battleground update
It is worth recalling that Hamas has no interest in holding territory in the face of Israeli incursions. Rather, Hamas needs to show some resistance, inflict damage through ambushes, sniper fire, and ranged attacks; hide when Israel concentrates too much firepower; attack again during Israeli force drawdowns, then reconstitute and re-establish control after Israel withdraws.
We believe that Israeli reports of successes in destroying Hamas battalions are highly exaggerated. This is demonstrated by the ongoing fighting in Jabaliya Camp, north of Gaza City, where Israel had previously entered and claimed to have defeated Hamas, and in Beit Hanoun, the first town Israel entered during the ground campaign. Now, intense fighting is ongoing in both locations, with Hamas offering very stiff resistance.
Hamas and other factions have resumed artillery and rocket fire on areas around Gaza more regularly. This shows that Hamas and the resistance factions are still fully functional.
Moreover, Hamas shows continuing ability to conduct complex ambushes and assaults that reflect its continued ability to collect intelligence, manage logistics, allocate resources and maintain fully functional command and control.
Additionally, Hamas has been repeatedly using mortars and light rockets to target Israel’s logistics and supply lines, as well as command centres in Gaza. This reflects the group’s continued freedom of movement – despite the sky in Gaza being full of Israeli drones. Such attacks are intended to demoralise the Israeli command and wear down the soldiers deployed in Gaza.
None of this is to say that Hamas has not suffered heavy losses. Of course it has. The point, however, is that Hamas is still a fully functional militant group with effective intelligence, command and control, able to resume governing Gaza immediately after the war.
Hezbollah vs Israel
The French, the US and others have been seeking to pressure Hezbollah, through a combination of threats and economic incentives, to halt its backing for Hamas. These attempts predictably failed. They stand no chance of succeeding.
Rather, Hezbollah has been steadily showing increased capabilities, and placing enormous pressure on Israel. Hezbollah has shown that it can regularly penetrate Israeli air defences. This has maintained deterrence between Israel and Hezbollah, where the two sides exchange body blows intended to test the other side’s appetite for escalation. Ultimately, this ends up maintaining limits on escalation.
On 16 May, Hezbollah launched the single largest group of attacks on Israel. These included the use of armed suicide drones – drones that fire Russian missiles and then attack targets – and the firing of tens of missiles, guided and unguided, targeting a range of military industrial facilities, surveillance equipment and barracks.
Hezbollah struck an Israeli intelligence gathering blimp before it took off from a base in the Tiberias region. This is the heart of Israel’s northern command and forms the deep rear of Israel’s positions in the north. The Tiberias region is guarded by at least four, probably more, layers of air defence: along the border, on second line bases, in Meron, and in the Tiberias region itself. Furthermore, the targeting shows that Hezbollah has advance intelligence of Israel’s own intelligence collection plans. That means that Hezbollah was gathering intelligence, likely through undetected drones or through human sources, and then conducted the attack.
In these attacks, Hezbollah showed that it could strike all of Israel’s positions in the north of the country regardless of ai defence. Hezbollah has repeatedly shown that it can target Israel in depth, collect intelligence on Israeli activities beyond visual range, identify new Israeli emplacements, including command centres, target advanced systems, including air defence systems, and strike well-defended command centres.
This means that Hezbollah can disrupt Israel’s ability to mass soldiers for a northern offensive. That helps Hezbollah maintain deterrence.
We repeat that Hezbollah most likely has everything that the Houthis have, and more. Moreover, Hezbollah would not be fighting alone in this or in any future war, as the full Resistance Axis would back it.
The end of the war
There is no timeline for when Hamas would be defeated. Thus far, Israel’s scorched earth policy has failed, especially when Hamas’ unconventional fighting style is understood correctly. This emphasises the importance of the US-Israeli siege on Gaza – without an effective siege, there is no hope of defeating Hamas.
However, in reality, Gaza has been under siege since 2006. The Israelis, with US backing, are simply recycling a failed strategy. This emphasises our claim that the war can continue for some time.
Western and Israeli policymakers, and some of their Arab allies, hope that they can impose either the Palestinian Authority or some other Israel-friendly faction as Gaza’s government. That is extremely unrealistic. Hamas can stop anyone from working in Gaza; it has large public support; it can penetrate the Rafah barrier through tunnels, and it has the full support of the Resistance Axis. Simply, trying to destroy Hamas entirely can trigger a regional war, which the US has shown that it does not want.
As such, the war is likely to end due to Israel’s exhaustion, not the defeat of Hamas. Therefore, the longer the war continues, the more onerous Hamas’ and the Resistance Axis’ demands will become.
Emphasising Israel’s untenable situation, success for Hamas in Gaza – which is defined merely by survival – would ensure that the West Bank also erupts in violence, as it would discredit the PA. Already, this trend is underway, with Israel unable to effectively police the West Bank and resorting to airstrikes in some locations.
This tendency will worsen at the death of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, as his successor is unlikely to have broad support. Rather, Fatah is likely to splinter, with at least some factions siding with Hamas and the Resistance Axis.
This suggests that, as the war continues, Hamas’ demands will again focus on concessions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, making it harder for Israel to end the war.
Commercial Impact
The Resistance Axis is holding back on attacking in the Eastern Mediterranean, most likely because they do not need to take an escalatory step right now. They are holding that card for now, most likely to stop Israel from advancing too far in Rafah, or to use it when they sense Israel is facing a major internal crisis or is severely exhausted.
We note that greater escalation will be to the detriment of Israel. The Israelis are incapable of winning against Hamas, and it is very unlikely that they can win against Hezbollah.
Escalation pathways include Iraqi PMU attacks on US bases, Ansar Allah (Houthi) or PMU attacks on US bases in the Gulf, Israeli strikes on Beirut, Hamas attacks on the US floating pier, the sinking of US ships, and attacks on shipping headed to Israel in the Eastern Med. Any or all of these can be used to raise pressure to end the war.
We note that the US and Iran are still not expressing interest in a direct conflict.