Israeli strikes on Iran likely within days
Israeli strikes on Iran likely within days
Blinken's 21-25 Oct visit to the region likely to be followed by further escalation, with Israel and Iran exchanging a new round of blows. Airspace in the Gulf, Jordan, Iraq and Israel to be impacted.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is conducting a visit to Israel. Blinken’s visit to the Middle East is scheduled to continue until 25 October. We expect Israeli attacks on Iran after Blinken leaves Israel, which may be in the coming 12-24 hours, or, more likely, after he leaves the region on 25 October.
Previous visits by Blinken were regularly followed by escalation - as were visits by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the US. Most notably, Blinken visited Israel on the eve of the start of the ground campaign in Gaza, and on the eve of Israel’s assault on Rafah. Netanyahu visited the US before the assassination of Hamas Politburo Leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and before the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.
The high likelihood of an Israeli strike is confirmed by statements from Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant after his meeting with Blinken. Gallant said that the US’ support for Israel after its attack on Iran will help deter Iran’s “Axis of Evil”. This suggests that Gallant and Blinken agreed on Israel’s response, and on continued US support.
Israeli public statements have indicated that a major attack is likely, and accepted that Iran will respond. Moreover, presidential candidate and former President Donald Trump has been urging Israel to strike Iran’s nuclear programme and energy infrastructure. Netanyahu wants more escalation up to drawing the US into a war with Iran, and will calculate that the Biden administration has no choice but to back him, in line with what we believe to be the Pentagon’s wishes. Furthermore, the US has already deployed THAAD systems to Israel, helping to protect Israel against Iran’s likely response.
Commercial Impact
It is unclear what airspace Israel will use. Using Gulf Arab or Jordanian airspace may lead to direct Iranian retaliation against these countries.
Israel’s most likely option is Syria and then Iraq, but this risks a Russian warning to Iran. This option would also likely result in disruption to the Iraqi, Jordanian, Iranian, Lebanese and Israeli airspaces.
Alternatively, Israel can use missiles, including from submarines, to target locations in Iran. This would reduce risks to regional countries.
Israel does not have the ability to severely damage the Iranian nuclear programme. Rather, Iran’s reaction to an attack on its nuclear programme will likely be to accelerate it. Israel has severely weakened Hamas and is weakening Hezbollah, degrading Iran’s regional deterrence. To restore deterrence, Iran will likely acquire or test nuclear weapons. This may backfire spectacularly, and lead to even more escalation.
Iran’s stated position, expressed by centrist then-President Hassan Rouhani, is that if Iran cannot export oil, no one can export oil. Gulf Arab states facing the risk of an Iranian attack may instead choose to join in an oil embargo to deny Iran an excuse to attack their energy infrastructure. Either way, an attack on Iranian energy is likely to lead to major dislocation in oil markets.
Iran and Israel have so far chosen to avoid rapid reactions. Rather, they have taken their time responding to each other’s steps, widely consulting with regional states and with Great Power backers before acting. So long as this persists, it will be an important indicator of managed escalation. By contrast, a rapid Iranian military reaction to Israeli strikes, followed by a rapid Israeli reaction, would indicate that we are closer to a regional war which draws in the United States.