From Lebanon war to regional war?
Israeli escalation against Hezbollah would not achieve any strategic objectives without Türkiye, and the US, backing a resumption of the Syrian civil war, risking Iranian and Russian responses.
Commercial Summary: For Israel to achieve a strategic success against Hezbollah, it would need the cooperation of Türkiye and to resume the Syrian civil war, in the hope of toppling Assad. Otherwise, Hezbollah capabilities would be quickly restored. A war in which Israel partners with Türkiye to weaken Assad, and therefore Iran and Russia, would carry a severe risk of miscalculation and escalation. If such a war occurs, F-35 sales to Türkiye would be much more likely, while Turkish economic interests in Iraq would be severely harmed. Alternatively, if Israel limits itself to attacks against Hezbollah, then the war would not change the strategic picture in any meaningful way, and Hezbollah would fully restore its capabilities within two to three years, if not less.
Again, Israel has declared its intent to attack Hezbollah. This time, PM Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli Defence Forces Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi have declared that they are readying ground formations for an attack against Hezbollah intended to push it away from the border and secure the north. We have argued repeatedly that such an attack would be extremely costly for Israel, perhaps prohibitively so, and would achieve very little. Here, we examine Israel’s only alternative approach: an undeclared alliance with Türkiye and Syrian jihadis intended to create a strategic shift in Syria, significantly weakening Hezbollah.
Israel’s options: a pointless campaign or extreme escalation
For Israel, merely attacking and degrading Hezbollah is not going to achieve a strategic victory. Hezbollah has an open supply line to Syria and on to Iraq and Iran. It can be fully re-equipped without issue, with all its losses compensated and its capabilities enhanced, most likely within two-three years if not less. As Hezbollah’s most potent weapons are stored deep underground, the impact of a war on degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities would be limited.
What would be a strategic game changer is for Israel and the US to attempt to collapse the Syrian government’s forces through concerted strikes on frontline positions in northern Syria. This would create an opening for Turkish-backed jihadist militias to move southwards, with the aim of bringing down Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. A Syria ruled by Sunni jihadists would be naturally hostile to Hezbollah, and the damage inflicted on the group would be far more lasting. Such an outcome would create a civil war in Lebanon and expand the ongoing civil war in Syria, and possibly in Iraq.
It is worth recalling that this was the main objective of US in backing the Sunni jihadi factions in the Syrian civil war. The US failed to achieve its objective. There is, however, renewed impetus to try again.
Israeli/US logic
Such a policy, however, would risk bringing in Iran and Russia. Both countries are deployed in Syria, though Russian air defence assets are limited in number and are not enough to stop the Israeli air force. It is also worth recalling that Ukrainian drone attacks within Russia have expanded significantly, despite Ukraine’s repeated territorial setbacks on the battlefield. The West has also begun supplying Ukraine with small numbers of F-16 jets and is close to permitting Ukraine to use long range rockets on Russian territory. Given the vastness of Russia, its air defence needs are quite significant. Therefore, Russia’s ability to resupply its Syrian bases with air defence systems will be constrained.
Additionally, Iran’s lack of response to Hamas Politburo Chief Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran is also likely encouraging for Israel. Iran is clearly not seeking a confrontation with the US, most likely because of the cost of such a confrontation and the opportunities it would create for Iran’s numerous regional rivals. This lack of response, however, will encourage Israeli adventurism. Israel is most likely assured that the US would defend it against a Russian and/or Iranian reaction.
This policy would be exceptionally risky. However, the Israelis believe that their survival is at stake. For the United States, its presence and credibility in the Middle East are on the line. Recall that the US has been losing its proxy wars against Iran, including in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Escalation is the only option that preserves the US’ hegemonic role in the Middle East and prevents Iran from redrawing the region.
Türkiye’s perspective
Türkiye does not want to see a full Russian victory in Ukraine. We have consistently defined Russian victory as the capture of Odessa. Russian control of Crimea and Odessa would be perceived as a major threat to NATO and especially to Türkiye.
Moreover, for Türkiye, Iran’s deployment all along its southern border is a major strategic threat, as it makes the Anatolian heartland vulnerable to Iranian short-range missiles, and as it risks overstretching Turkish troops. Therefore, Türkiye has an interest in re-igniting the proxy war against Iran, and in pushing Iran back to, ideally, southern Iraq and away from the northern parts of the KRG. However, for Türkiye, this policy carries most of the risks, and the benefits are very uncertain. Erdogan would require major military and economic concessions to pursue such a strategy.
Iran, the US and the jihadis
The dramatic escalation scenario described above reflects the success of Iran’s strategy, in that it has successfully placed the US in a bind whereby, to defeat Iran and its proxies, the US must wage war across Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and perhaps Iran itself. Such a war would bleed the US into bankruptcy, given the astronomical cost. However, the biggest vulnerability of Iran remains unchanged: the Sunni populations of the countries that its proxies currently dominate.
Any American strategy against Iran must, by definition, involve the classical alliance between Sunni extremism and the United States. Turkiye’s role would be both, to stoke this Sunni extremism and to contain or direct it, a role analogous to that played by Saudi Arabia in the 1980s in Afghanistan and in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. It is unclear if Türkiye wants to play this role, but that is the only role that can allow it to compete against Iran for regional hegemony.
Timeframe
Israel is set to launch its attacks on Hezbollah most likely within the coming month or so. Recall that Israel has not started the school year in the north, meaning that it is not under time pressure to initiate this conflict. Israel may wish to fight Hezbollah in winter, given Hezbollah’s limited night vision capabilities and the pressure on pro-Hezbollah civilians.
Furthermore, Türkiye will not immediately attack Syria using its Syrian proxies. Rather, it will assess whether the US and Israel have achieved enough against Assad before deciding to act. A resumption of the Syrian civil war would take years to play out. Similarly, the Iranian reaction to such a campaign would be slow moving, as have all Iranian policy moves.
Implications:
If Israel’s campaign remains restricted to attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon, the battle would remain localised. Iran would still fear losing its influence in Iraq and Syria and would prioritise preserving its assets there over fighting Israel. The attacks from Iraq and Syria would intensify, but would be nowhere near their full potential. The pro-Iran militia presence in Iraq and Syria is key to rebuilding Hezbollah and deterring Türkiye and Israel.
For Iran, Hezbollah’s main purpose is to deter Israel and the US. An attack on Hezbollah, regardless of its extent, would likely encourage Iran to seek nuclear deterrence. An Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons may trigger US pre-emptive strikes against Iran.
Moreover, the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, which the US may not be able to prevent, would likely encourage the US, Israel and Türkiye to clip Iran’s wings in the region, rather than allow it to operate its proxies freely and under a nuclear umbrella.
Türkiye being seen to take advantage of Israeli strikes would place Turkish economic interests in Iraq at severe risk, including in energy and construction. There is a budding rapprochement between Iraq and Türkiye, aimed in part at restoring Iraqi oil exports via Iraq. Israeli-Turkish cooperation against the Syrian government would scuttle it.