Escalation: Contained or uncontrolled?
The Israel – Gaza war is already regional – the question is will it remain contained. Below are some indicators to watch, and the implications of some escalation scenarios.
As things stand, the Israel – Hamas conflict has already expanded to include the rest of the region, albeit at a low level. Multiple members of the Iran – led Resistance Axis members (Yemen’s Ansar Allah or Houthi Movement, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Syrian government, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Units) have launched attacks against Israeli and US interests. The US said it responded by attacking two Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) bases in Syria, but that did not stop Iraqi militants from conducting fresh attacks. In Yemen, the Ansar Allah Movement has conducted at least two large missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against Israel. The group claimed to have attacked an Israeli naval and aerial base in Eritrea’s Dahlak Islands, killing one officer. The question is whether this now regional war will remain contained, as it currently is, or if the players will lose control of events. To understand the implications of uncontrolled escalation, I invite you to read my piece below on why on a regional war is becoming more likely.
It is worth recalling that, from a US perspective, trying to reconcile with Iran was not successful, due to the combination of American and Iranian internal dynamics and foreign policies. Therefore, it is easier, if one is sitting in the Pentagon, to assume that only a military solution against Iran would work.
From an Iranian perspective, the aim is to expel the US from West Asia (the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, the Levant, Israel – Palestine and Jordan). Iran is not deterred by the US, nor is it seeking a full confrontation. Rather, Iran believes that a combination of political, military and economic pressure can lead it to attaining its objective, while accepting the risk of a full-scale conflict with the US.
An uncontrolled conflict would entail Iran declaring an energy embargo against the West. Gulf Arab countries would face a choice between accepting and complying with an Iranian-led embargo, and Iran attacking their energy infrastructure while the US attacks Iran.
Iran and its allies have regularly spoken of gradual escalation as their option for fighting Israel and the US, with regular threats of uncontrolled escalation, that is, all out war.
Iran likely has a menu of options when it comes to attacking Israeli and US interests to achieve its objectives. This menu may include:
Hizbullah entering the war fully, as opposed to merely harassing Israel to keep Israeli forces deployed north, as is currently the case.
Using Syria as a base from which to fire large volumes of rockets into the Golan, which is internationally recognised as Israeli-occupied territory, or into Israel proper.
Firing high precision crusie missiles from Iraq into Israel.
Iran pressing its Iraqi allies to pass a parliamentary resolution or a cabinet decree to expel the US from Iraq.
Pro-Iran militias, backed by the Iraqi government, pushing against the KRG in Iraq.
Iranian-backed militias in Iraq expanding their attacks in Iraq and Syria, with the aim of overrunning some US bases rather than merely harassing them with missile strikes.
Iran’s allies in Syria attacking Kurdish forces backed by the US, possibly in coordination with Turkey.
Yemen’s Ansar Allah Movement targeting shipping headed to Israel on a weekly basis, then even more frequently.
Yemen’s Ansar Allah Movement announcing that it would block energy traffic passing through Bab al-Mandab to impose an energy embargo on the West.
Iraqi protesters at Terbil crossing heading into Jordan to attempt to reach the West Bank, placing the Jordanian goverment in an untenable position.
Iraqi protesters heading to the border with Kuwait, ostensibly to pressure Kuwait into expelling US forces.
Iran declaring an energy embargo and demands that the Arab states of the Persian Gulf join with it, with the threat of attacks by the Houthi used to impose compliance.
Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking energy infrastructure in the Gulf countries that do not join an embargo, using Yemeni proxies.
Iran firing missiles at US bases in Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait.
Iran using anti-ship missiles, including from civilian container ships, to strike US naval assets.
From within a likely menu of escalation options, Iran’s allies have already:
Attacked the US in Syria and Iraq to emphasise that these forces are targets, not assets.
Conducted strikes from the Golan against Israel, which cut off power in parts of the Golan, to highlight the risk of escalation and the presence of high precision capabilities in Syria.
Launched missiles from Yemen against Israel to highlight Yemen’s willingness to engage in the conflict more fully.
Attacked an Israeli base in Eritrea to highlight their capabilities in the Red Sea
Launched attacks from Lebanon intended to disable Israel’s border surveillance equipment and force Israeli forces to remain in the north.
Iran’s red line is the defeat of Hamas in Gaza, as this would pave the way for the expulsion of Gazans and of West Bank Palestinians, thereby ending its ability to pressure Israel.
The US needs Israel to win this conflict clearly, as failing to do so would convince Egypt and Jordan that betting on Israel is unwise, making their cold peace more fragile and making them more likely to support militancy, placing Israel in an untenable position.
Statements from Israel indicate that Israel and Hamas are ready for a conflict that lasts for several months, up to a year. Given the stakes involved, a long conflict is indeed likely, unless Israel faces severe and unexpected losses in Gaza.
Indicators that the escalation will remain contained:
Israel’s airstrikes in Lebanon remain mostly south of the Litani River in Lebanon, and Hizbullah’s missile strikes against Israel are mostly north of the line between Acre and the Sea of Galilee.
Hizbullah sticks to the objective of keeping Israeli military resources tied down in the north, rather than allowing Israel to fully commit to attacking Hamas and Gaza.
Pro-Iran militias’ attacks in Iraq and Syria inflict injuries, but not several deaths or more.
US attacks against pro-Iran militias are mostly in Syria, not in Iraq itself, and occur sporadically – no more than once or twice a week.
Yemeni attacks against Israel occur in small bursts, with or two or three strikes per week, rather than daily.
Syrian government and Turkish government forces, or their allies and proxies, conduct attacks against the Syrian Kurds backed by the US in Hasaka, Deir al-Zour and Raqqa, which would be within the “rules of the game”.
Indicators that Hizbullah is about to fully enter the war:
Hizbullah officials visit Moscow and/or Beijing, accompanied by Iranian officials.
Hizbullah attacks escalate from striking four or five Israeli positions per day using one or two anti-tank missiles each, to an all-out strike on all or most positions across northern Israel simultaneously.
Hizbullah announces that it has disabled 90% of Israeli surveillance equipment in northern Israel, indicating that it is ready for the next phase in the conflict.
Hizbullah begins launching missiles into Haifa and Tel Aviv in large salvoes.
Hizbullah begins targeting Israeli command centres and/or critical airbases.
Israel conducts strikes deep in the Bekaa, or in the southern suburb of Beirut, or assassinates senior Hizbullah commanders.
Israel conducts extensive air strikes north of the Litani River.
Having captured Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun in Gaza, Israel comes close to reaching the centre of Gaza City.
Change in the tone of coverage on pro-Hizbullah Al Mayadeen or Al Manar TV stations, showing less triumphalism and certainty about their eventual victory.
Israel successfully cuts off northern Gaza from southern Gaza through a ground invasion.
Israeli politicians attempt a major celebration on the Temple Mount/Al Aqsa Mosque.
Implications of Hizbullah fully entering the war:
Extensive damage to Israeli infrastructure, including airports, ports, offshore energy, power plants, desalination plants, energy storage and chemicals industries, especially in Haifa and the Tel Aviv.
Extensive damage to Lebanese infrastructure, including civilian warehouses, industry, and farms, but also key electricity, port, energy storage, roads, bridges and other infrastructure at a level considerably worse than 2006.
Attacks against the Lebanese Army, especially in south Lebanon, paving the way for state collapse and Hezbollah consolidation.
Hizbulllah attacks against domestic rivals after the war, forcing Lebanon fully into the Iran - Russia - China axis.
Extensive US sanctions against Lebanon.
The destruction of the southern suburb of Beirut (Dahiyeh) and of most villages, Christian and Muslim, in south Lebanon.
Anti-ship missiles targeting civilian shipping heading into Israel as well as Israeli offshore energy infrastructure.
Extensive Israeli and US attacks against the Syrian government, paving the way for the expansion of the influence of jihadist groups there.
Rising risk of Russian air defence systems in Syria being activated against Israel.
Rising risk of broader escalation involving the US and Iran.
Indicators that Iran will attempt to fully expel the US from Iraq.
Iraqi protesters surround the US embassy for several days, with some breaking in.
The Iraqi Parliament passes a resolution to expel US forces, followed by a statement from the Prime Minister asking US troops to leave immediately.