Israel strikes Iran
Israel strikes Iran
The implications of the US-enabled Israeli strike on Iran and why we think more is coming
In an operation lasting around three hours in the early morning of 26 October 2024, Israel conducted strikes against Iranian military infrastructure. This was right after American Secretary of State Antony Blinken left the region, in line with our expectations. The Israelis quickly announced that the strike was concluded.
100 Israeli F-35s participated. Open source intelligence analysts reported a large inflow of American KC-135 tankers, suggesting that the US participated heavily in aerial refuelling.
It is unclear what path the Israeli jets took - Iran had warned that countries whose airspace was made available to Israel would be attacked. It is unclear where the refuelling took place either. The answers to these questions will help determine the likely Iranian response, including whether Iran attacks regional countries. Saudi Arabia and Oman were quick to condemn the Israeli strike.
The targets
The Israeli strike took place in three waves, intended to highlight Israel’s freedom of manoeuvre and its ability to strike at will. Israel had notified Iran of the strikes, and, reportedly, gave indications of the nature of the targets. Again, this was aimed at highlighting Israel’s freedom of action.
The Israelis struck a total of twenty targets. These included military objectives in Tehran, the capital, in Khuzestan, in the far west of Iran and where its oil infrastructure is located, and in Ilam, just north of Khuzestan. Ilam and Khuzestan provide very good launch sites for Iranian missiles, due to their proximity to Israel. The message there was that the launchers could be reached, whereas the attack on Tehran is intended to highlight Israel’s ability to strike in depth.
The twenty targets themselves were reported, without enough specifics, as air defence sites and drone, missile and other weapons production facilities. Media claimed that sites used to produce drones for Russia were targeted. In reality, Russia is producing its own copies of Iranian drones.
That oil infrastructure was not targeted reflects US pressure to manage the narrative around escalation, as well as the escalation itself. That nuclear was not targeted likely reflects Israel’s inability to do adequate damage - a strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would backfire and drive Iran to build a bomb.
The reaction
Iran was quick to downplay the incident, as Israel and the West did with the 14 September attack. The Iranians are claiming that the attack on Tehran was 100% intercepted. When similar claims were made by the West about the Iranian 14 April attack (99% interceptions), we said this was as credible as Saddam winning 99% of the vote. We believe the same thing here. We are unable to confirm the precise success of the strike, but we do not believe that any air defence system has 99% success rates, nor that any attack has 100% success rate. The ongoing wars in the Middle East and Ukraine demonstrate this.
Tasnim and Press TV, two media outlets linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, were quick to downplay the damage and over emphasise the success of the Iranian air defence. This is an important indication of standing Iranian instructions not to escalate further.
The key dynamics
Iran’s 1 October attack was in retaliation to Israel killing Hamas politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran during the Iranian president’s inauguration. Israel’s attack, therefore, is not justified from Iran’s perspective and from the perspective of its supporters.
Iran’s supporters are baying for blood. Iran’s two attacks on Israel, in April and October, are seen as well below what is needed given the importance of Hezbollah to Iran’s military strategy, and of Hamas and Palestine to Iran’s ideological stances.
The US is not trying to de-escalate. It is trying to manage the escalation and the narratives around escalation. The US is fighting to prove to the Middle East that it is an effective security guarantor, and it needs Israel to succeed against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran to keep Gulf Arab countries from committing to BRICS, drawing closer to China and Russia, and reconciling with Iran.
These considerations supersede the American elections. They are what should be focused on, not the diplomatic words of Antony Blinken, which are somehow always followed by escalation.
As for the elections, a key dynamic we are concerned with is Trump winning the election and calling for more attacks on Iran before his inauguration. This would leave the administration helpless.
We note, again, that Israel still wants the US to take out Iran’s nuclear infrastructure militarily. This is the overarching objective. Israel sees a generational opportunity to do so.
The Forecast and Indicators
Indicators
Statements from the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are critical. He will likely speak soon, at most by 1 November during Friday prayers. He will give an indication of what response to expect.
If Khamenei claims that Israel is trying to force a war with the US which Iran does not want, then that will be a strong de-escalatory indicator. Conversely, expressing readiness for war and committing to retaliation would indicate greater risks.
The key indicator to watch is the speed of Iran’s response. Faster reactions indicate that things are getting out of control.
Another indicator to watch is the volume of the Iranian response and its components. Drones that get intercepted, or older and slower ballistic missiles, such as occurred in April, are a lower escalatory step than using near hypersonic missiles, as occurred in October.
A critical indicator is the level of Israeli casualties in south Lebanon. If Israel loses 100 soldiers per month, it will likely have to suspend its operations there.
Israel may wish to continue airstrikes against Hezbollah even as it ends its ground operations. This may lead to Hezbollah launching a ground incursion into Israel, leading to much greater escalation across the region.
Forecast
We expect Iran to retaliate with several hundred ordnances.
We expect the US to keep backing Israel into escalating further.
Israel sees a generational opportunity to strike Iran and weaken it. This is not over.
Even if Iran does not retaliate, Israel will create a reason for a new round of escalation. Its survival is at stake.