All-out war
The long anticipated Israel-Hezbollah war has begun in earnest. Iran has not decided to fight yet, but Israel is seeking a total regional war that may turn global.
Commercial Summary: War between Hezbollah and Israel has begun, perhaps lasting years. Israel cannot win this war decisively unless the Syrian government is overthrown, which is unattainable in the coming 2-3 years. We may be heading to a point where no one has a clear, non-messianic, non-genocidal political objective, with the war being open-ended and nihilistic. Iran is still holding Hezbollah back, likely seeking full Chinese and Russian support. That support is likely to be forthcoming in the 12-month outlook. Far heavier attacks on northern Israel are almost certain in the coming hours.
Incidents:
Israel has launched more than 300 airstrikes against no less than 50 towns throughout Lebanon in a few hours on 23 September 2024. Neutral media is describing this as the “Gaza-fication” of south Lebanon.
Hermel and Jbeil were also hit, and the strikes are not limited to south Lebanon.
Initial reports suggest 100 deaths and 400 injured, including civilians. This is likely to be reviewed upwards.
Israel is sending messages to local residents in south Lebanon to get them to evacuate. An exodus has already begun. Past precedent suggests that one quarter to one third will not leave. Israel will very soon begin the systematic destruction of all Lebanese villages south of the Litani River.
On 22 September, Hezbollah launched hundreds of rockets into regions north of Haifa, with a focus on the Ramat David airbase and the Rafael military industries facilities. On 23 September, it launched tens of missiles, though it will likely conduct further strikes during the day.
Israel claims that it can launch more than 1000 airstrikes per day, and estimates that Hezbollah can launch 1,000 to 2,000 missiles per day.
Iraqi militias have increased their participation in the conflict, firing cruise missiles and drones that they had not previously used.
This is still below full-scale war where both sides use their capabilities without any restraint, but that is the next logical step.
Commercial Impact
Hezbollah is choosing not to use its precision or heavy rockets so far. This is likely to change soon, especially if the number of civilian deaths reaches tens per day. At that point, Israel will no longer be able to hold Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps back.
All industrial assets in Haifa and north of Haifa will then be at severe risk of precision-strikes from Hezbollah.
The bombing of Beirut in a manner even mildly similar to 2006 would result in bombardment of Tel Aviv, and perhaps of long range rockets being used against Israeli air bases in the south.
Israeli attacks on Lebanon’s ports would result in Hezbollah attacks on at least Haifa’s port and perhaps on Ashkelon and Ashdod.
If there were a full-scale war, in which Israel bombards Lebanon in the same way it is bombarding Gaza, Hezbollah would indiscriminately fire missiles into Tel Aviv and the centre of Israel (Gush Dan).
Some of Hezbollah’s missiles have guidance systems, enabling it to target individual buildings associated with the government or with specific military or commercial interests.
Analysis
Deterrence is collapsing quickly.
So far, Hezbollah has successfully deterred Israel from targeting civilians in the manner it did in Gaza, or in the Lebanon wars of 1982, 1993, 1996 or 2006.
As Israeli airstrikes escalate, and civilian casualties intensify, the risk is that deterrence will fully break down, leading to all-out escalation.
Hezbollah and Israel have different warfighting styles. Hezbollah is aiming for a long and slow war, whereas Israel is aiming for a large and fast war.
Both sides’ political objectives are unrealistic.
The war is over who can destabilise the other side’s civilian population more: Hezbollah has forced more than half a million Israelis into shelters and out of work. Israel is now doing the same to up to a million Lebanese.
Israel wants to turn the Lebanese against Hezbollah’s policy of supporting Gaza. It had failed to turn Hezbollah’s supporters in its various previous wars, and those who oppose Hezbollah will oppose it regardless of war.
As civilian casualties from Israeli attacks increase, opposition to Hezbollah will decrease, as occurred in 2006, and as occurred in Gaza and in Lebanon in previous wars.
Hezbollah wants to force Israel to stop the war in Gaza, but Israel views this as an existential threat, and is committed to destroying Hamas, which itself appears unrealistic.
Hezbollah is off balance, but only up to a point.
Through the pager and walkie talkie detonations, and the assassination of senior Ridwan Force commanders (the elite unit charged with frontline defence and with penetrating into northern Israel), the Israeli military has demonstrated unprecedented intelligence capabilities.
This has likely made Hezbollah question all its communications networks as well as its senior leadership’s penetration by Israeli intelligence.
However, this has not stopped Hezbollah firing rockets and conducting regular operations against Israel all along the border.
Hezbollah would welcome a ground operation.
Israeli leaders are talking of a ground operation to capture and hold territory in South Lebanon, in a repeat of Israel’s security belt that it established between 1978 and 2000.
Hezbollah is extremely well-prepared and well-equipped for such a conflict. It would be able to inflict far more casualties on Israel in this scenario.
The war is open-ended, with no timeframe for its conclusion
Israel has decided to go to a regional war, as we have argued since Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to the US in July. It has full US authorisation to do so.
This will be a very long war. Israel has yet to uproot Hamas from Gaza, even after 11 months and a half of fighting. Hezbollah is much stronger than Hamas, and Lebanon is much bigger than Gaza.
This war is existential. If Israel is fought to a draw, as occurred to 2006, local powers will understand that the US is no longer the key player in the region, and will prioritise ties with Türkiye, Iran, Russia and China at the US’ expense.
As such, Israel will not end this war unless it is defeated or it is made economically unviable. Hezbollah does not have the ability to defeat Israel.
Israel cannot beat Hezbollah unless the Syrian government is overthrown by Sunni jihadis.
Hamas is besieged, while Hezbollah has an open supply line by sea and by land to Iran.
Hezbollah’s collapse is only possible if Lebanon’s airport and ports are shut AND if Syria is taken by jihadis. Attempting this can lead to Turkish, Jordanian, Iranian and Russian involvement in the conflict, as discussed here and here.
That would take years to achieve - the US tried to do it from 2011 to 2017.
Israeli actions in the West Bank also indicate a long war.
Israel expelled Al Jazeera from the West Bank. This is a prelude to doing to the West Bank something similar to what was done to Gaza, with the aim of ensuring that there is no organised resistance there.
That makes the continuation of regional war more likely: Israeli consolidation over the West Bank would be seen as destroying the Palestinian cause, and as paving the way for Israel changing the religious status quo in the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa Mosque. Given the religious nature of this conflict (see below), this would drive far more escalation.
We may be heading to a point where no one has a clear, non-messianic, non-genocidal political objective, with the war being open-ended and nihilistic.
If Iran does not escalate, it risks losing everything
Israel has gone from attacking and destroying all civilian infrastructure in Gaza to starting to do the same in Lebanon. If Israel is not stopped, it will turn its attention to Syria and then to Iraq and then to Iran.
This would leave all regions controlled by Iran’s allies in ruins. Not to mention flooding Türkiye and Europe with migrants.
Iran is worried about regional escalation, and is likely seeking support from its allies, which will be forthcoming.
Iran is likely still placing a leash on Hezbollah and Iraqi factions, preventing them from fully activating all the capabilities they have demonstrated.
Iran knows it can survive a war with the US. However, such a war would weaken it enormously, opening the way for Türkiye and other Sunni powers to reverse Iran’s gains in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. This is likely what is holding Iran back.
To counter this possibility, Iran will seek Russian and Chinese support before escalating further.
Bogging down the US in the Middle East suits Russia and China, freeing them in Ukraine and Taiwan. (We discuss Taiwan in a bit more detail here).
Russia and China will provide Iran with the support it needs, including weapons, communications equipment, access to satellites and so on. They will mirror, as best as they can, what NATO is providing Ukraine.
With a war raging in Europe, and another in the Middle East, historians will refer to this as a Third World War, especially if and when China invades Taiwan. You are living in history.